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THE TREATMENT OF REFUSALS TO CROSS
PICKET LINES: "BY-PATHS AND
INDIRECT CROOKT WAYS"
James T. Carneyt and Mark J. Florsheim-
It is axiomatic that the strike is the most important weapon in
the labor union's arsenal. It is doubtful, however, that a strike would
be a potent weapon in any conflict other than one conducted by an
extremely cohesive group were it not for its enforcing arm-the picket
line. Pickets discourage work by employees who would not on their
own initiative remain away from the job. Pickets also discourage
workers of secondary employers from performing tasks that necessitate
contact with the strike area. Most of the controversy surrounding
the picket line problem has involved the extent to which and the
methods by which picket lines may be established. The converse of
the problem-the question of the circumstances under which employees
may honor a picket line and refuse to carry out their normal duties
-has attracted relatively little attention.'
Justification for this lack of attention is easily found. The normal
American worker's reaction to a picket line is to head immediately
in the opposite direction. The reasons for this reaction are varied.
Many American workingmen feel an almost sacrosanct regard for
picket lines.2 Some see their economic interest directly or indirectly
involved in observance of all picket lines;3 others are moved by fear
* W. SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF THE HISTORY OF HENRY IV, Act IV, scene v
(J. Wilson ed. 1946).
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. A.B. 1964, LL.B. 1967, Yale University.
-- Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. A.B. 1964, Columbia Col-
lege; LL.B. 1967, New York University; M.A. 1970, George Washington University.
I There seem to be only three articles dealing with this problem: O'Connor, Respect-
ing Picket Lines: A Union View, N.Y.U. 7TH CONF. ON LAB. 235 (1954); Petro, National
Labor Policy and Respect for Picket Lines, 3 LAB. L.J. 83 (1952); Thatcher & Finley, Re-
spect for Picket Lines, 32 NEB. L. Rv. 25 (1952). There have also been a number of stu-
dent notes and comments on this problem. See, e.g., Note, Respect for Picket Lines, 42
IND. L.J. 536 (1967).
2 Cf. L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 868, 874 (1946), enforcement
denied, 163 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948), where the Board
observed that "[i]t is almost a rule of trade union ethics for one labor union to respect
a picket line established by another."
8 Cf. Cyril de Cordova & Bros., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950).
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of the social ostracism, 4 economic reprisal,5 or physical violence that
might result from crossing a picket line. Against such pressures, fear
of an employer's wrath avails little. Employers, cognizant of their lack
of practical weapons to overcome employee convictions regarding
picket lines, and possibly believing that isolated iefusals to cross picket
lines are not particularly harmful, generally have chosen to fight for
legal limitations on the power of employees to establish picket lines
rather than on their power to refuse to cross them.
Nevertheless, some employers have attempted by discharge or
other disciplinary measures to limit the power of their employees to
refuse to cross a picket line. These attempts have raised the issue of
the employer's right to discipline employees who refuse to cross picket
lines in the normal course of their employment.7 Although there often
is a similarity between the factual situations and policy considerations
involved in these cases and those involved in partial strikes," sympathy
strikes,9 and refusals to "scab,"'1 the Board and the courts have, for
the most part, treated the refusal-to-cross cases as sui generis.
Superficially, at least, the basic legal questions involved in this
problem seem simple. Section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act (LMRA)" guarantees workers covered by the Act the right to
"engage in ... concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection."
4 Cf. New York Tel. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 383 (1950).
5 Cf. Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), enforcement
denied sub noma. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd,
388 US. 175 (1967).
6 Cf. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545
(1962), enforced sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
7 The converse problem is presented where a union attempts to discipline a member
for crossing a picket line. See Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67
(1964), enforcement denied sub nom. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F2d 656 (7th
Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 175 (967).
8 C.G. Conn, Ltd., 10 N.L.R.B. 498 (1938), enforcement denied, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir.
1939); Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676 (1938).
9 Cummer-Graham Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 722 (1950); Granite City Steel Co., 87 N.L.R.B.,
894 (1949). It is particularly hard to distinguish between cases involving a sympathy strike
and caseg involving a refusal to cross a picket line since both actions occur for much the
same reason and produce much the same result. Generally, however, the sympathy striker
takes action before a picket line is erected and acts solely because of his sympathy with the
initial grievants, while the employee who refuses to cross a picket line takes no action
until the line is erected and then acts at least partly out of general regard for the picket
line, rather than exclusively out of sympathy with the grievants.
10 Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502 (1965); Columbia Pictures Corp., 82
N.L.R.B. 568 (1949), enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1951); Pinaud, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 235 (1943); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.,
34 N.L.R.B. 346, modified, 127 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1942).
11 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 12 makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]." To determine whether
an employer has a right to discipline an employee for the latter's refusal
to carry out assigned duties, it is only necessary to decide whether
or not such a refusal is a protected activity within the terms of section
7.13 Assuming the refusal constitutes a protected activity, the employer
may still be permitted to replace the refusing employee if the re-
placement falls within the Mackay rule.14
Unfortunately, the relatively simple legal questions of whether
a refusal is protected and, if so, to what degree this protection is af-
fected by the Mackay rule, are obscured by the more complex policy
issue of the extent to which it is in the public interest to protect
such refusals.' 5 This issue requires a balancing of the interests of the
affected parties.
In any refusal to cross a picket line case, there may be as many
as six potential parties-the refuser, his employer, his union, the pickets,
12 Id. § 158(a)(1).
13 The Board often holds that a discharge for a refusal to cross a picket line violates
§ 8(a)(3) as well as § 8(a)(1) on the ground that a discharge for engaging in a protected
activity is inherently discriminatory, despite the absence of proof of any specific anti-
union animus on the part of the employer. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1950),
enforcement denied, 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 885 (1951). But see
General Electric Co., 6-CA-4377 (May 27, 1969) (trial examiner's decision).
For a discussion of the demise of the necessity of proving specific anti-union animus
for an 8(a)(3) violation, see Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination
Under the NLRA: The Legacy of American Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70
CoLum. L. REv. 81 (1970). The Board may hold that discharge for refusal to cross a
picket line constitutes an 8(a)(3) violation when the employer assigns a union activist
to a mission where he would encounter a picket line in the hopes of provoking a refusal
that would justify the discharge. See Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 108 (1962),
enforced, 317 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 945 (1963).
14 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). In Mackay, the Supreme
Court ruled that an employer confronted with an economic strike could permanently re-
place the strikers without committing an unfair labor practice. It established the principle
that the employer could, under some circumstances, employ certain retaliatory measures
against employees who engaged in concerted activity against him for the purpose of ad-
vancing their economic interest at his expense. Although the decision made little logical
sense, since it is a contradiction to hold that concerted activity is "protected" but still
subjects the actor to the risk of losing his position, it is quite defensible on economic
grounds, since it established an arena in which the parties are free to engage in economic
conflict on relatively equal terms. The Mackay rule did not completely destroy the pro-
tection that § 7 affords employees because the weapons the employer can use under the
Mackay rule to deal with concerted activities are less effective, for the most part, than
those which he can use to deal with activities unprotected by § 7.
15 Another legal problem that arises is whether the refusing employee is eligible for
unemployment compensation if such refusal results in his temporary or permanent dis-
charge from work. See 44 IowA L. REv. 819 (1959); 37 Noax DAmm LAw. 739 (1962).
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their union, and the picketed employer. The diverse interests of these
parties can best be understood by an examination of the following
situations in which refusals to cross picket lines seem to occur:
I. Refusals to cross picket lines at one's place of employment
A. Picket line erected by fellow workers in one's bargaining
unit
B. Picket line erected by fellow workers not in one's bargain-
ing unit
C. Picket line erected by outsiders
II. Refusals to cross picket lines at another's place of employment
A. Picket line erected by workers of the picketed employer
B. Picket line erected by outsiders.
The refuser normally has a strong economic interest in honoring
only a picket line of type I-A and a limited economic interest in hon-
oring a picket line of type I-B, although in a given situation he may
have some indirect interests in honoring other picket lines. The re-
fuser's employer has a great economic interest in having the refuser
cross the picket lines in situation I and a limited economic interest
in having the refuser cross the picket line in situation II. The refuser's
union (or potential union) has a great economic interest in having
him honor the picket line of type I-A and may, depending on the
circumstances, have a limited economic interest in having the refuser
honor picket lines of the other types. Under some circumstances,
however, the refuser's union may have a slight interest in having him
cross picket lines* of types I-B, I-C, and II because failure of the
refuser to cross these picket lines may result in the picketed employer's
business being shifted away from the refuser's unionized employer to
a non-unionized employer. Generally, the picketers and their union
have a limited economic interest in having the refuser honor the picket
line, while the picketed employer has an equally limited interest in
having the refuser cross the picket line.
The public interest, as well as the interests of the immediate
parties, may be involved in these picket line cases. Generally, it is in
the public interest to attempt to localize labor disputes. Therefore,
consideration should be given to whether the refusal involves a primary
or a secondary picket line.16 Further, it is usually in the public interest
10 Section 8(b)(4) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964),
protects the right of unions to erect picket lines at the establishment of an employer with
whom the union is having a dispute, if the object of the dispute is to improve the terms
and conditions of employment of workers employed by that employer. This section gen-
era~ly makes it an unfair labor practice for unions to erect picket lines at the establishment
of an employer when the object of the dispute is to improve terms and conditions of em-
1970]
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to have employees act only through their collective bargaining rep-
resentative and not to engage in individual work stoppages. Some
consideration must therefore be given to the effect that a refusal has
on a collective bargaining relationship. This is particularly important
where the parties may have tried to regulate the right to refuse cross-
ing a picket line or the obligation to cross a picket line in the col-
lective bargaining agreement.
Who is to make the policy determinations concerning this bal-
ancing of interests? In theory, the answer is threefold. First, Congress
is given the responsibility for creating a national labor policy. Second,
the NLRB is given the responsibility for executing congressional
policy by filling in legislative interstices where necessary and by re-
solving conflicts between opposing policy considerations. Third, the
courts are given the responsibility of overseeing the work of the NLRB
to assure that it develops a coherent body of law properly implement-
ing the congressional purpose.17 This tripartite system thus places
the major responsibility for formulating policy with Congress, as the
initial policymaker, and with the courts, as the ultimate interpreters
of congressional intent. It assigns to the NLRB the task of implement-
ing such policy on a day-to-day basis. In practice, none of these bodies
has effectively performed the fun&ions assigned it when dealing with
refusals to cross picket lines. How inadequately this tripartite system
has worked may be seen in the following history of such refusals.
I
To PROTECT OR NOT To PROTECT
The legislative history of the Wagner Act 8 indicates that Congress
intended that Act to protect the worker who refused to cross a primary
picket line legitimately erected at his place of employment. This
ployment of workers not employed by that employer. The former kind of dispute is a
primary dispute; the latter, a secondary one.
17 For a general discussion of the roles of the NLRB and the courts, see Winter,
Judicial Review ol Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REv.
53. Arbitration may also provide a medium for the balancing of interests in a labor dis-
pute. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Since arbitration is limited to the role
assigned to it by the parties in their collecive bargaining agreement, and thus less likely
to reflect considerations other than the interests of the parties directly involved, it is
not dealt with in this article.
18 The Wagner Act has been incorporated into the Labor-Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
[Vol. 55:940
REFUSALS TO CROSS PICKET LINES
intention was a logical corollary of Congress's general decision to safe-
guard the right to strike. In acting, however, Congress was thinking
not in terms of the right to refuse to cross picket lines but of the right
to engage in a primary strike for economic gain. To protect the latter,
Congress had to assist those who refused to work out of sympathy
with the strike. This was essential, not only because such protection
implemented the congressional goal of strengthening workers engaged
in a primary strike, but also because such protection avoided the neces-
sity of dealing with the probably insoluble questions of determining
what factors motivated an individual's refusal to cross a picket line
at his place of employment. Congress, however, failed to go beyond
its determination to protect refusals to cross picket lines in the legiti-
mate primary strike situation and apparently never considered the
possible existence of other situations giving rise to such refusals.
A. In the beginning...
The initial refusal cases were, for the most part, of the kind en-
visaged by Congress: refusals to cross picket lines at the refuser's work
site where the picket line was erected by fellow employees whose
economic interests were identical with those of the refuser. In the
Wagner Act period, the NLRB did not seem to handle refusals that
had occurred at a plant other than one operated by the refuser's em-
ployer. Nevertheless, the NLRB did confront some refusals that differed I
from the ordinary case. In Club Troika, Inc.,10 Rock Hill Printing A
Finishing Co., 20 Montag Brothers,21 L.A. Young Spring & Wire Co.,22(
and Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp.,23 employees refused to cross pri-
mary picket lines erected at their places of employment by fellow
employees. Their situations differed significantly from the normal
19 2 N.L.R.B. 90, 94 (1936).
20 29 N.L.R.B. 673 (1941), enforced, 131 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1942).
21 51 N.L.R.B. 366 (1943), enforced, 140 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1944).
22 70 N.L.R.B. 868 (1946), enforcement denied, 163 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 887 (1948).
23 84 N.L.R.B. 851 (1949), enforced sub nom. Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F2d 652 (7th
Cir. 1950). In this case, certain foremen represented by one union left their emergency
positions inside the plant when the production and maintenance workers who were repre-
sented by another union set up picket lines around the works. The employer subsequently
discharged the foremen. The trial examiner and the Board did not recognize that there was
a distinction in status between the production and maintenance workers and the foremen.
Although the trial examiner held the foremen's activities to be protected, the Board, two
members dissenting, noted that the foremen's presence in the plant was necessary to safe-
guard the plant and maintain vital services for the city of Gary. It therefore concluded
that the interests of the employer and the city in this case outweighed the interests of the
foremen and ruled that the foremen's actions were unprotected.
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refusal situation because the lines they honored, though erected by
fellow employees, were not erected by employees with identical eco-
nomic interests. The refusers in these cases were supervisors honoring
lines erected by bargaining unit personnel, craftsmen honoring non-
craft lines, or non-craftsmen honoring craft lines. The NLRB, how-
ever, appeared oblivious to this distinction. It made no attempt to
consider whether the language or the legislative history of section 7
justified protection of these refusals nor to examine the policy im-
plications involved in these cases; the Board mechanically ruled that
these refusals to cross picket lines were protected by section 7.
B. Towards Rockaway
Since neither the NLRB nor the courts had by 1947 confronted
what would become the classic refusal case-refusal to cross a picket
line erected at another employer's place of business-it is not sur-
prising to discover that Congress, when in 1947 it again directed its
attention to labor problems, did not concern itself directly with re-
fusals to cross picket lines. Nevertheless, the LMRA did contain,
attached to the section 8(b)(4) proscription of certain secondary ac-
tivities, a puzzling proviso:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection shall be con-
strued to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the
premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the
employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or
approved by a representative of such employees whom such em-
ployer is required to recognize under this subchapter . ... 24
There is no evidence to indicate that the significance of this
proviso was ever discussed in Congress.25 The lack of discussion is
unfortunate because the proviso, as it appears in the LMRA, makes
no real sense. Since there is nothing in section 8(b) to indicate that
24 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
25 The proviso seems to have originated in another bill (S. 55, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947)) which made certain types of secondary activity criminal but contained a provision
exempting individual refusals to cross picket lines under the circumstances set forth in
the proviso to § 8(b)(4). O'Connor, supra note 1, at 265-66. The Senate report on the
proviso contained the following comment:
Attached to section 8(b)(4) is a proviso clause, which makes it clear that it shall
not be unlawful for any person to refuse to enter upon the premises of any em-
ployer (other than his own), if the employees of that employer are engaged in a
strike authorized by a union entitled to exclusive recognition. In other words,
refusing to cross a picket line or otherwise refusing to engage in strikebreaking
activities would not be deemed an unfair labor practice unless the strike is a
"wildcat" strike by a minority group.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947).
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an individual refusal to cross a picket line under any circumstances
would constitute an "unfair labor practice," let alone be "unlawful,"
there seems to be no need for a proviso specifically stating that under
some circumstances such refusal would not be unlawful. The proviso
stands more as a hallmark of careless draftsmanship than as an expres-
sion of congressional intent regarding refusals to cross picket lines.
The Board was next confronted by a refusal to cross a picket
line in Illinois Bell Telephone Co. 28 The employer here had two
divisions that were represented by different unions: Chicago by the
Chicago Telephone Traffic Union (CTTU); the rest of the state by
the Illinois Telephone Traffic Union (ITTU). The contracts covering
both bargaining units expired at about the same time. The CTTU
extended its contract while continuing to negotiate with the employer;
the ITTU struck and erected picket lines at the employer's business
locations, including those employing CTTU-represented personnel.
The complaining employees, members of a CTTU unit, refused to
cross the picket line and stayed out until the ITTU strike was settled
and the pickets removed. In retaliation the employer demoted them.
Although the trial examiner recognized the essential difference in
status and interest between the strikers and those who honored their
picket lines,27 he did not examine the language of the Act and its
legislative history to determine whether or not Congress had intended
to protect activity of this nature, nor did he weigh the policy con-
siderations involved. He simply ruled that refusals to cross picket
lines were protected by the Act, except in circumstances where a re-
fusal to cross a picket line might endanger the physical safety of the
plant. The Board upheld the trial examiner's ruling without elabo-
rating on the rationale behind it.
The Seventh Circuit overruled the Board's determination that
these refusals were protected under the terms of the Act28 and then
20 88 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1950), enforcement denied, 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 885 (1951).
27 88 N.LR.B. at 1188.
28 The court questioned whether the refusal was a "concerted activity" within the
meaning of § 7. It pointed out that the complaining employees had not acted in concert with
each other and rejected the Board's contention that the complainants had acted in con-
cert with the pickets since they had refused to cross the picket line out of sympathy with
the picketers' cause. The court also questioned whether the refusal was for the refusers'
"mutual aid and protection." It noted that the picketers and the complaining employees
belonged to different bargaining units and, consequently, had different interests, so that
the action of the refusing employees did nothing to advance their own interest. 189 F.2d
at 127-28. But the court failed to recognize that the refusal to cross the picket line could
have been intended to advance the interests of the refusers as well as the picketers.
19701
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questioned whether the refusals should be protected.29 It approvingly
quoted NLRB v. Draper Corp.,30 which held that employees who
participated in a wildcat strike were not engaging in a protected ac-
tivity because their strike was "a strike in violation of the purposes
of the act by a minority group of employees in an effort to interfere
with the collective bargaining by the duly authorized bargaining
agent selected by all the employees." 31 The Seventh Circuit indicated
that the Illinois Bell employees, by refusing to work during a period
in which there was a valid collective bargaining agreement in effect,
were engaging in the same kind of wildcat action as the employees
in Draper, and that action in derogation of their bargaining agreement
should not be protected under the Act.
Following the NLRB's Illinois Bell decision, but prior to the
Seventh Circuit's refusal to enforce the Board's order therein, the
NLRB, in New York Telephone Co.8 2 and Cinch Manufacturing
Corp.,33 continued to rule that refusals to cross picket lines were pro-
tected. The Board seemed to indicate, however, that individual refusals
to cross a picket line, motivated by fear, would not constitute concerted
activity protected under the Act.34 In Cyril de Cordova & Brothers,35
the NLRB for the first time confronted the troublesome proviso to
section 8(b)(4). There, the trial examiner found in it an expression
of general congressional intent to protect refusals. The Board, admit-
tedly puzzled, determined that nothing in the proviso indicated re-
fusals to cross lawful picket lines should not be protected and dropped
the matter.
The question of whether refusals to cross picket lines were pro-
tected arose again in Rockaway News Supply Co.26 The charging
29 Id. at 128-29. For a detailed analysis of the factors to be weighed in deciding the
categories of picketers who should be protected by LMRA § 7, see Getman, The Protection
of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L.
RFv. 1195 (1967).
30 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
31 Id. at 202, quoted in 189 F.2d at 128.
32 89 N.L.R.B. 383 (1950).
33 91 N.L.R.B. 371 (1950).
34 In New York Telephone, the employers argued that the refusals were not protected
because they were not the result of concerted activity but were due to fear of the picketers;
the trial examiner and the Board found, however, that the employee had acted out of
sympathy for the picketers. 89 N.L.R.B. at 384, 389-90. In Cinch Manufacturing, the trial
examiner and the Board found that the employees had acted out of fear, but that their
action was concerted in the sense that it was a collective action resulting from consulta-
tion among the refusers themselves. 91 N.L.R.B. at 372, 381.
35 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950).
36 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951), enforcement denied, 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345
US. 71 (1953). See text at notes 83-87 infra.
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party, a driver for a newspaper delivery company, refused to enter
the premises of one of his employer's customers when he saw that
the customer's locale was surrounded by a picket line. Without dis-
cussing its history or significance, the trial examiner read the proviso
to section 8(b)(4), together with the Board's decisions in Illinois Bell3 7
and Cyril de Cordova, to establish a rule that refusals to cross picket
lines of the type described in the proviso were protected. He then
ruled that the challenged refusal came under that rule because the
picket line had been a valid one. In upholding the trial examiner,
the Board rejected an argument by the employer that the approach
taken in this case would produce a result different from Cyril de Cor-
dova because refuser and picketer lacked common union membership.3
In effect, it held that common union membership and identity of
economic interests were irrelevant.
The Second Circuit agreed with the Board's conclusion that a
refusal to cross a picket line out of sympathy with the picketers was a
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection and was therefore pro-
tected under a literal interpretation of the Act. Its agreement with the
Board on this point proved illusory, however, because it went on to state
that refusals to cross picket lines occurring in the course of the working
day were not protected under the Act. The court held that the section
8(b)(4) proviso was intended solely to ensure that a refusal in this
situation would not be considered an unfair labor practice, not to
protect a refusing employee from discipline. It supported this con-
clusion with a reference to the Seventh Circuit's then-recent decision
in Illinois Bell.39 The effect of the Second Circuit's decision was to
cause most refusals to cross picket lines to be unprotected by section
8(a)(1), because almost all refusals occur during working time.
40
The Supreme Court failed to adopt the Second Circuit's analysis
of the case, declining to promulgate any "sweeping abstract prin-
ciples as to the respective rights of employer and employee regarding
37 The trial examiner's ruling in Rockawhzy News preceded that of the Seventh Circuit
in Illinois Bell.
38 95 N.L.R.B. at 337. In Cordova, the trial examiner had supported his ruling that
the refusal was protected by pointing to the identity of union membership and economic
interest between the picketers and the employee who refused to cross the picket line.
91 N.L.R.B. at 1135.
39 197 F.2d at 115. Judge Clark dissented. He claimed that the proviso indicated a
congressional intent to protect refusals to cross picket lines, although he cited nothing
in the legislative history to support this position. He chided his brethren for preempting
the Board's primary role as a policy maker. Id. at 116.
40 A refusal to cross a picket line during non-working time is presumably protected
by § 8(a)(3) as well as § 8(a)(1) since the only ground for employer action against such a
refusal would be anti-union bias.
1970]
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picket lines," 41 and decided the case on other grounds. The dissent
attempted to justify the Board's rule that refusals were protected by
referring without discussion to the 8(b)(4) proviso.42
C. Turn and Turn Again
By the time the NLRB encountered its next case involving a refusal
to cross a picket line, the Truman Board had been replaced in large
measure by Eisenhower appointees. The effect was evident in Auto Parts
Co. 43 There, an automobile parts dealer whose employees were repre-
sented by the Teamsters hired a member of the International Associa-
tion of Machinists. This new employee refused to deliver parts to an
automobile dealer serviced by his employer because the striking em-
ployees of that and other dealers were represented by the IAM and had
erected picket lines around their lots. As a result the employer dis-
charged the employee, who in turn filed unfair labor practice charges
alleging that the refusal was protected under section 7. The trial ex-
aminer rejected the argument accepted by the examiner in Cyril de
Cordova that the proviso to section 8(b)(4) indicated a congressional
desire to protect such refusals. He pointed out that "[a]ll the proviso
stands for.., is the proposition that the refusal by a person to enter
the premises of an employer other than his own, under the indicated
conditions, does not constitute an unfair labor practice by a labor organ-
ization."44 He then noted that the Second and Seventh Circuits had
both effectively held that such refusals were unprotected by the Act,
and that the Supreme Court had rejected a contention put forth by
the dissenters in Rockaway that these refusals were protected. Conse-
quently, he dismissed the unfair labor practice charges. The Board
found it unnecessary to adopt the trial examiner's view of the proviso
to section 8(b)(4). It declared that since the case involved nothing more
than .simple insubordination, discharge was justified.
45
41 345 U.S. at 75.
42 Id. at 81. See text at notes 24-25 supra.
48 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953). The Rockaway case was decided by a unanimous Board
composed of Members Herzog, Houston, Reynolds, and Murdock, with Member Styles not
participating. The Auto Parts case was decided by a unanimous Board composed of Mem-
bers Farmer, Rodgers, Beeson, and Peterson, with Member Murdock not participating.
Thus, none of the Board members who decided Auto Parts had been on the Board when
Rockaway was decided; three of the four were Eisenhower appointees.
44 Id. at 246.
45 The Board attempted to distinguish this case from the other refusal cases by saying.
We do not consider it material here that part of [the employee's] assigned duties
which he chose not to perform were in some manner related to the union activities
of employees elsewhere or to [his] own union predilections. Therefore we do not
adopt the Trial Examiner's comments as to the applicability here of Board or
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In Redwing Carriers, Inc.,46 decided eight years after Auto Parts,47
a mineral products hauler discharged a number of his non-unionized
drivers for their refusal to cross a picket line erected at the mine of one
of his major customers. This refusal was motivated by the drivers' fear
of the strikers: prior to their refusal to cross the lines two other driv-
ers had been threatened and one had been assaulted. The Board's
General Counsel argued that section 50248 of the LMRA protected this
refusal because it was a refusal by the employee to undertake an activity
that was abnormally dangerous. The trial examiner simply ruled that
these refusals were protected, and then turned to section 502 to find
some further support for the result. He declared:
[Section 502 of] the Act gives employees, acting in concert and in
the face of abnormally dangerous conditions, a right to quit their
labor without penalty (either in the face of a no-strike clause or
where there is no such clause) in order to protect their health and
their lives.49
The Board refused to apply section 502 to this situation, h'owever,
because no abnormally dangerous conditions existed-a conclusion
that did some violence to the facts of the case. The Board then held,
on the authority of Auto Parts, that the employer had justifiably dis-
charged the men for a refusal to carry out orders.85
The Teamsters local that had been involved in Redwing appealed
court cases on the issue of concerted activities by employees of diverse employers.
Similarly, we find it unnecessary to adopt the Trial Examiner's comments as to
the import of the proviso to Section 8(b)(4) of the Act.
Id. at 243.
46 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961) (Redwing 1), modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced
sub. noma. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 905 (1964).
47 There was one intervening case, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954).
The Board there held that employees who refused to cross illegal "hit and run"
picket lines were not protected by the Act. Member Murdock dissented, citing Cyril de
Cordova for the principle that any discharge for the refusal to cross a picket line con-
stituted an unfair labor practice. Id. at 1558.
48 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1964).
49 130 N.L.R.B. at 1216.
50 Id. at 1211-12. The trial examiner also noted that a common carrier called upon
to transport goods across a picket line is placed in a particularly difficult situation since
it may be legally obligated to transport such goods, though unable to persuade any of its
employees to cross the picket lines. Id. See generally Elbert & Rebman, Common Carriers
and Picket Lines, 1955 WAst. U.L.Q. 232; Flood, Common Carrier's Duty to Serve Strike-
Bound Plants, 24 ICC PRAc. J. 30 (1956); Katcher, The Duty of a Common Carrier to
Handle Strike-Bound Goods, 24 ICC P.AC. J. 22 (1956); Marshall, Carrier Service and the
Picket Line: A Dilemma, 13 LAB. L.J. 301 (1962); Scurlock, Carriers and the Duty to
Cross Picket Lines, 39 T xAs L. REv. 298 (1961); Woods, The Plight of a Strike Bound
Carrier, 33 MINN. L. REv. 255 (1949).
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the Board's order to the District of Columbia Circuit. Before that ap-
peal was heard, however, the Board filed a motion with the court to
have the case remanded to it for further consideration, probably because
the Eisenhower Board had been replaced in part by Kennedy appoin-
tees.51 In Redwing II the Board recognized that Auto Parts constituted
a reversal of its previous position. It thus decided to ignore Auto Parts,
and, relying instead on the authority of earlier cases such as Cyril de
Cordova, ruled that refusals to cross picket lines were protected under
the Act. However, it held that these discharges were justified under
the Mackay rule.
52
The Teamsters appealed the Board's final order to the District of
Columbia Circuit. That court refused to discuss the substantive ques-
tion of whether refusals to cross picket lines were protected, and, with-
out entering into the merits of the issue, it enforced the Board's rul-
ing.53
The Board chose, however, to construe the court's disposition of
the case as a wholehearted endorsement of its position that refusals to
cross picket lines were protected. Thus armed with precedent, the Board
confronted L.G. Everist, Inc.,54 in which four drivers of the Everist
trucking firm were discharged for refusing to make deliveries to a con-
struction site that was being picketed. Both the trial examiner and the
Board (Members Leedom and Rodgers dissenting) ruled that these
refusals were protected; the Eighth Circuit disagreed.5 5 The Board ap-
peared to be little disturbed by its defeat in yet another circuit. In
51 Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962) (Redwing 11), modifying 130
N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), enforced sub noma. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964). Redwing I was decided by a Board
composed of Rodgers, Leedom, and Fanning, with Jenkins and Kimball not participating.
Redwing II was decided by a Board composed of McCulloch, Brown, and Fanning, with
Leedom concurring only in the result and Rodgers not participating. Of the Redwing II
majority only Fanning had participated in Redwing I; McCulloch and Browi were Ken-
nedy appointees. Actually, the Board had started reversing its position in Cone Bros.
Contracting Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 108 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 945 (1963). There, the employer had conspired to place certain union activist em--
ployees in a situation where they would be forced to cross a picket line and refuse to
do so; thus, he hoped to be justified in discharging them. The Board ruled that this
action constituted an independent 8(a)(3) violation but declared in dicta that "even in
the absence of such scheme the discharge of these employees for engaging in the pro-
tected activity of concertedly refusing to cross the picket line violated Sections 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act." 135 N.L.R.B. at 109 (footnote omitted).
52 137 N.L.R.B. at 1547-48. See note 14 supra and text at notes 58-59 infra.
53 325 F.2d at 1012.
54 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963), enforced in part, 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
55 334 F.2d at 317-18.
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Overnite Transportation Co.,5 6 the Board found that a discharge for a
refusal to cross a picket line was both a general violation of sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) and a specific violation of section 8(a)(3) because it
was the result of anti-union animus. The District of Columbia Circuit
enforced the Board's order solely on the ground that the discharge was
motivated by specific anti-union animus, once again carefully refraining
from endorsing the Board's rule that these refusals were protected.
Undaunted, the Board has continued to hold that refusals to cross
picket lines are protected.
57
II
Mackay AND ITS PROGENY
A. Replacement Before Discharge
The determination that an employee's refusal to cross a picket line
is protected does not resolve every question pertaining to the refusal.
Indeed, the further question of whether the employer has the right to
take action against the refusing employee is immediately presented.
This question stems from the decision of the Supreme Court, in NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,58 that an employer may permanently
replace employees who engage in an economic strike, even though he
may not discharge such employees for engaging in the protected activity.
The Court invoked the principle, which seems never to have been con-
sidered by Congress when it passed the Wagner Act, that an employer
may avail himself of reasonable recourse against employees who are
engaged in an economic action against him even though the activities
engaged in are protected.
Some employers accused of committing an unfair labor practice
56 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965) (Overnite 1), enforced in part, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
57 See Smith Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (July 1, 1969) (involving a refusal by
a driver to unload a truck even though the pickets had permitted him to cross the picket
line); Southern Greyhound Lines, 169 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 67 L.R.R.M. 1368 (Feb. 23, 1968),
enforced, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1970); Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 147,
67 L.R.R.M. 1039 (Dec. 29, 1967); Vangas, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 67 L.R.R.M. 1108
(Dec. 19, 1967); G & H Towing Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 66 L.R.R.M. 1343 (Nov. 30,
1967); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967); Overnite Transp. Co., 164
N.L.R.B. 72 (1967); K.B. & J. Young's Super Markets, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 271 (1966), en-
forced, 377 172d 463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967) (court of appeals enforcing
Board's order on theory that employer acted with specific anti-union animus); Canada
Dry Corp., 154 N.L.RXB. 1763 (1965).
58 304 U.S. 333 (1938). See note 14 supra.
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by discharging an employee who refused to cross a picket line have
invoked the Mackay principle in justification of their action. This
argument was first made in Illinois Bell, but the trial examiner re-
jected it. He observed that the Mackay rule permitted an employer to
replace, though not to discharge, an employee who was engaged in an
'economic strike and to refuse to re-employ him if he had been perma-
nently replaced prior to termination of the strike and his application
for reinstatement. The trial examiner then pointed out that in Illinois
Bell the employees were demoted before being replaced, and conse-
quently the requirements of the Mackay rule had not been met.59
One possible explanation for the trial examiner's wooden applica-
tion of Mackay was his failure to realize an essential difference between
the economic strike and the refusal situation. In an economic strike,
the employer does not have to deal immediately with the striker because
the latter has absented himself completely from work; the employer
can hire a replacement, and at a later date notify the striker that he
has been replaced. In the refusal situation, however, the employer has
to deal promptly with the employee if he decides to replace him; it is
logical to discharge the refusing employee and thus make way for a per-
manent replacement. Although the intent of the employer and the end
result of his action are the same in either case, the unbending applica-
tion of Mackay produces different legal consequences. However, another
explanation may be given for the trial examiner's action. He may have
realized that in the strike situation the Mackay rule is of little advantage
to most employers because of the difficulty of replacing a work force
of any size when the force goes on strike. But, if the Mackay rule applied
to refusals, it might present a great practical advantage to employers
because it would enable them to replace, without fear of legal conse-
quence, those who refused to cross a picket line. The trial examiner
might have believed such a result would give the employer too great
an advantage over his work force; however, he did not discuss the
rationale behind his holding. The Board and the Seventh Circuit were
equally laconic.
Indeed, both the trial examiners and the Board in the next
two refusal cases-New York Telephone and Cinch Manufacturing-
avoided any mention of Mackay. The trial examiner in Cyril de Cor-
dova, however, was compelled by the employer's argument to confront
the issue. He indicated that the employer was not entirely defenseless
in the face of a refusal to cross a picket line since he could have forced
the employee to choose between performing all or none of his job and,
59 88 N.L.R.B. at 1192-97.
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in the event of the latter choice, find a permanent replacement for the
refusing employee. He held that by failing to afford his employee such
an election, the employer had waived his Mackay rights.0 0 The Board
adopted the trial examiner's ruling that the activity was protected with-
out discussing his Mackay theories.
In Rockaway News, the Board found that it could avoid the issue
no longer. Although the trial examiner had not discussed the Mackay
problem, the Board felt it necessary, in view of the employer's conten-
tion on appeal, to adopt the position taken by the trial examiner in
Cyril de Cordova. It therefore ruled that since the employer had dis-
charged and permanently replaced the employee before olfering him
the option of performing either all or none of his tasks, the employer
had lost the protection of the Mackay rule. The Second Circuit found
the Board's distinction between replacement prior to discharge and re-
placement after discharge "unrealistic." 6' 1 The Supreme Court, in its
opinion, was equally unkind to the Board. It declared:
The distinction between discharge and replacement in this context
seems to us as unrealistic and unfounded in law as the Court of
Appeals found it. This application of the distinction is not sanc-
tioned by Labor Board v. Mackay Co .... It is not based on any
difference in effect upon the employee .... Substantive rights and
duties in the field of labor-management do not depend on verbal
ritual reminiscent of medieval real property law.
62
In one sense, however, the Second Circuit's and the Supreme Court's
criticism of the Board's application of the Mackay rule may have missed
the point. The Board may have been deliberately applying the rule
in such a fashion as to prevent the employer from taking what seemed
to the Board unfair advantage of his economic strength. However, the
NLRB said nothing to indicate it was following such a rationale.
B. Discharge Before Replacement
In 1961, when the Board again began to protectrefusals to cross
picket lines, it apparently accepted the restrictions placed by the Second
Circuit and the Supreme Court on its application of Mackay to the
refusal situation. In Redwing II, the NLRB declared it would look to
the substance rather than the form of replacement of the refusing em-
ployees. The Board stated that "where it is clear from the record that
the employer acted only to preserve efficient operation of his business,
and terminated the services of the employees only so it could immedi-
60 91 N.L.R.B. at 1137-38.
61 197 F.2d at 115.
62 345 U.S. at 75.
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ately or within a short period thereafter replace them with others will-
ing to perform the scheduled work," 63 it may discharge the refusing
employees without committing an unfair labor practice even though the
refusal to cross a picket line is a protected activity.
In L.G. Everist,64 employees who were discharged for refusing to
cross a picket line had made unconditional applications for reinstate-
ment before their employer permanently replaced them. The trial ex-
aminer ruled the employees' job security was not protected by the
part of the Mackay rule that accords the right to be rehired to employ-
ees who have made such an application prior to replacement. 5 The
Board, two members dissenting, rejected this finding, pointing out that
if the refusals were protected, the employer had a right, in accordance
with the Mackay doctrine, to replace the refusing employees if such
replacement was necessary to continue the operation of the business.
But where the refusing employees applied for reinstatement before
they were permanently replaced, the same considerations that required
the employer to reinstate economic strikers were applicable. The Board
therefore held that the employer had committed an 8(a)(1) unfair labor
practice by refusing reinstatement.66 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit did
not rule on the question of protection, but instead held that the Board's
economic striker analogy had no support in precedent and ruled that
the employees were not entitled to reinstatement.67
In Overnite I, the Board again restricted the application of the
Mackay rule. The employee, a driver for a pickup and delivery service,
was ordered to make a pickup at a plant being picketed by members of
the same local that was attempting to organize his shop. When he re-
fused to cross the picket line, his employer discharged him. The trial
examiner upheld the discharge under the Mackay rule. The Board
concluded, however, that there was no justification for applying the
63 137 N.L.R.B. at 1547 (footnote omitted).
64 See text at notes 54-55 supra.
65 142 N.L.R.B. at 204.
66 Id. at 195.
67 The effect of this ruling was similar to that of the Second Circuit's opinion in
Rockaway News; it made these refusals unprotected.
Judge Matthes, in his dissent, properly criticized the majority on the ground that
"[tjhe pivotal issue presented by this proceeding, and so recognized by the parties, is
whether the refusal of the four employees to cross the picket line constituted protected ac-
tivity. The majority fails to come to grips with this question. ... 334 F.2d at 318. He
pointed out that the Supreme Court in Rockaway News had not rejected the discharge-
replacement dichotomy that the Board advanced in this case, but only its wooden applica-
tion. He then claimed that since the refusal was protected on the authority of Redwing
II, the Mackay doctrine was applicable and the Board had rightly held that the employees
were entitled to reinstatement in view of their unconditional application prior to replace-
ment.
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Mackay rule in this case because the employer did not need to replace
the employee in question; another driver had been sent in his place. 5
The Board thus rendered the Mackay rule virtually meaningless to
trucking firms. In almost every case the Board could find that thp
employer might have used another driver and, consequently, had no
legitimate reason to discharge the refusing driver.69
The Board similarly applied its restrictive version of the Macka.
rule in Overnite Transportation Co. (11)70 and Vangas, Inc.7 1 In Over
nite II, the trial examiner and the Board found that the discharge of a
driver who refused to cross a picket line was invalid, and that since the
employer could easily have found another driver to make the delivery
in question, he was not entitled to the benefit of Mackay. In Vangas, an
employee was discharged soon after announcing that he would not
make a delivery to a customer who was about to be struck. Although
the strike never occurred, the trial examiner held the refusal would
have been protected. He ruled that Mackay was not applicable because
the discharge occurred prior to actual refusal and because the employer
could have used another driver had the need arisen. His recommenda-
tion that the driver be reinstated with back pay was adopted by the
Board.
In Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.,72 where the refusal of both the
initial driver and his replacement to cross a picket line forced a super-
visor to make the delivery, the trial examiner upheld the subsequent
discharge and replacement of the initial driver, but not of his replace-
ment, on the ground that the employer's interest in maintaining its
normal business operations justified the discharge. He stated that "a
common carrier need not undergo the risk of repeated interruptions
of his regular operation and need not be prepared to institute emer-
gency procedures whenever such interruptions occur." 73 Having thus
made a telling rejection of the Board's general refusal rule, he then
turned around and ruled that the second discharge was not justified by
the employer's business interest, although the employer presumably
68 154 N.L.R.B. at 1275.
69 In K.B. & J. Young's Super Markets, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 271 (1966), enforced, 377
F.2d 463 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967), an employer discharged an employee
who refused to transfer from one store to another because such transfer would have obliged
her to cross a picket line at the second store. Neither the trial examiner nor the Board
even considered the application of the Mackay rule. The Ninth Circuit did not consider
this problem since it upheld the NLRB findings on the ground that this and other dis-
charges were motivated by specific anti-union animus.
70 164 N.L.R.B. 72 (1967).
71 168 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 67 L.R.R.M. 1108 (Dec. 19, 1967).
72 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967).
73 Id. at 866.
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would be subject to the same risk of future refusals from the second
employee as he would be from the first. The Board upheld this con-
tradictory decision, attempting to justify its ruling with the following
logic:
In the present case, Respondent required the services of only
a single driver to make the delivery of [this] merchandise. It did not
discharge [the second driver] until after the... delivery had been
made by a supervisor substituting for [the first driver]. At the time
of the discharge of [the second driver], therefore, there was no need
to hire a replacement for him to make a delivery which had already
been made by [the supeivisor]. Moreover, Respondent knew that
[the second driver] was a strong union adherent and thus would be
a poor replacement choice for crossing the picket line of a sister
labor organization. Under these circumstances, we find that [his]
discharge... was not justified .... 74
The NLRB commenced an attack on the replacement rule in the
non-trucking area in Canada Dry Corp.7r Here, drivers at a plant repre-
sented by the Teamsters struck, and the charging party, a mechanic not
represented by any union, was discharged for refusing to cross the picket
line. The trial examiner held his action was protected, not on the ra-
tionale of the ordinary refusal case, but on the rationale of the primary
strike case. He then held that since the refusal was protected and the
employee had been discharged before being replaced, the Mackay rule
was inapplicable.70 The Board adopted his rulings without discussion.
This result was followed in Southern Greyhound Lines,71 where an
office worker failed to cross a picket line established by janitorial em-
ployees. The trial examiner found the activity protected under the
primary strike rationale and held that Mackay was inapplicable because
the employer had failed to replace the employee prior to discharge.
The trial examiner attempted to distinguish this case from Rockaway,
Redwing, and Everist on the ground that it involved a picket line at
the worker's own place of employment rather than at another em-
ployer's locale.78
74 Id. at 862 (footnote omitted).
75 154 N.R.B. 1763 (1965).
76 Id. at 1769-70.
77 169 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 67 L.R.R.M.-1368 (Feb. 23, 1968), enforced, - F.2d - (5th
Cir. 1970).
78 The trial examiner admitted the weakness of this distinction when he said:
Insofar as anything said by the Board or the courts in the Redwing and the
Everist cases may be interpreted as inconsistent with my finding herein that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging and refusing to
reinstate [the employee for refusal] to come to work through the picket line, I
must respectfully decline to follow such a holding.
Id. at 4 (trial examiner's decision). In G & H Towing Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 66
L.R.R.M. 1843 (Nov. 80, 1967), a case not involving a trucking firm, the Board found
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The NLRB seems to have completed its demolition job on the
Mackay principle in non-trucking situations by its decision in Swain &
Morris Construction Co 0 9 The employer, engaged in the construction
of power and light facilities, shifted a construction crew from one locale
to another to do some more urgent work. After the shift, the former
locale was picketed. Upon completion of work at the second locale, the
employer prepared to send the crew back to finish the first job, but
the crew members refused to return and were discharged. The em-
ployer then brought in another crew that finished the job without hav-
ing to cross the picket line because it had since been removed. The
employer re-employed several crewmen who made application for re-
instatement before being permanently replaced; the rest filed a com-
plaint with the NLRB. The trial examiner ruled that the refusals
were protected, but he upheld the discharges on the ground that the
employer was justified in replacing these men because they had caused
him great inconvenience.80 The Board refused to go along with the trial
examiner, holding that he had misapplied the Redwing doctrine. Not-
ing that the employer failed to replace the members of the crew im-
mediately after discharge (chiefly because of the shortage of linemen),
the Board revoked the dismissals and resurrected its replacement-dis-
charge dichotomy."'
III
CONTRACT REGULATION OF REFUSALS To CROSS PIcKET LINES
A. No-Strike Clauses
In Rockaway News,12 the employer justified his discharge of an
employee who refused to cross a picket line on the ground that the
that an employer did rightfully replace two employees who refused to cross a picket line
to man their vessel.
79 168 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 67 L.R.R.M. 1039 (Dec. 29, 1967).
80 Id. at 11 (trial examiner's decision).
81 Id. at 5-6, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1040-41. One criticism of the Board's use of the Mackay
rule in the refusal cases is that it offers inadequate guidance for the parties. The refusin 1
employee cannot tell in advance whether he might be lawfully replaced; his employer
cannot tell in advance whether he might lawfully replace the refusing employee. Neither
has any real hope of obtaining effective legal counsel because of the limited time in whichf
to make a decision. Thus, the effect of the Board's rule is to encourage litigation in these.
cases. Of course, the Board could defend its conclusion by pointing out that a literal
application of Mackay would give the employer "unnecessary" power. However, one might
be somewhat skeptical of the Board's ability to determine in a given situation whether the
power to replace was or was not "necessary" for the effident .oeration of the employer's
business.
82 See text at notes 36.42 supra.
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refusal violated the "no-strike" clause contained in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.8 3 The trial examiner and the Board had rejected
the employer's contention because the contract contained an illegal
union security clause and was thus void.84 The Second Circuit had
ignored this aspect of the employer's argument altogether in its opinion.
The Supreme Court, however, seized upon the no-strike clause issue.
It ruled that this refusal constituted a prima facie violation of the no-
strike clause, and that the labor contract was not totally invalid despite
.the illegal union security clause. The Court pointed out that the proviso
'to section 8(b)(4) p~rmitted the parties to agree on no-strike clauses and
'that such clauses prohibited refusals to cross picket lines. The Court
.then held that a refusal to cross a picket line in violation of a no-strike
clause was not a protected activity under section 7.85 The dissent by
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Minton, accepted in cur-
sory fashion the Board's conclusion that the proviso to section 8(b)(4)
indicated a congressional intent to protect all refusals to cross picket
lines. It criticized the majority's rejection of the Board's ruling on the
validity of the contract on the illogical ground that the Court should
not "substitute its judgment about this contract for that of the Board."8 6
The dissent implied that the contract's no-strike clause was not applic-
able to a refusal to cross a picket line, stating that it could "find no
language in that contract which would justify the discharge of the
employee here because he insisted upon respecting a union picket
line."8 7
The NLRB did not consider another refusal involving a contract
containing a no-strike clause until eleven years later in Southwest
Banana Distributors, Inc.8 8 In that case, the employer had discharged
certain workers who, in violation of the no-strike clause in their con-
tract, had refused to cross a picket line established by their union at
another employer's place of work and thereafter had refused to work
at all. The NLRB's General Counsel, in arguing this case, claimed that
since the defendant employer and the secondary employer were owned
83 The clause read as follows: "No strikes, lockouts or other cessation of work or inter-
ference therewith shall be ordered or sanctioned by any party hereto during the term
hereof except as against a party failing to comply with a decision, award, or order of the
Adjustment Board." 95 N.L.R.B. at 346.
84 Id. at 337. In an earlier case involving the same employer, the Board had ruled
that the same contract was invalid because it contained an illegal union security clause.
Rockaway News Supply Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1951).
85 345 U.S. at 78-81.
86 Id. at 82.
87 Id.
88 145 N.L.R.B. 815 (1964).
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and operated by the same individuals, the refusers were actually engag-
ing in a primary protected activity. The trial examiner, without decid-
ing whether the employers constituted a single employer under the
LMRA, ruled that the employer had a right to discharge an employee
who violated a no-strike clause unless the strike was an unfair labor
'practice strike or the refusal to work was protected by section 502 of
the ActY9 He then ruled that since the refusals to work did not fall
within either exception, they were unprotected and thus the discharge
was lawful. The Board adopted his rulings without discussion.
The NLRB's decision to abandon its observance of the Rockaway
rule became evident in G & H Towing Co.9 0 G & H Towing had a con-
tract with the union that contained a no-strike clause. Although the
contract had expired prior to the refusal of two employees to cross a
picket line and approach a ship, it had been extended and was still in
effect at the time the incident occurred. The trial examiner found that
the extension was invalid, but ruled that the discharge of the employees
was justified because refusals to cross picket lines were not protected
by the Act.91 The Board did not accept the trial examiner's reasoning
on either point; ignoring the Rockaway rule that refusals by employees
covered by no-strike clauses were unprotected, the Board concluded
that the employees had been properly replaced under Mackay.
2
In Swain & Morris Construction Co.,13 the Board completed its
abandonment of Rockaway. Here an employer who employed IBEW
members pursuant to a contract that contained a no-strike clause dis-
charged a crew of employees for refusing to cross a picket line to work
on a project. The trial examiner held that Rockaway did not justify
these discharges because the language of the no-strike clause in this case
was distinguishable from the language of the no-strike clause in Rocka-
way. 4 The Board ruled that the discharges were invalid and carefully
avoided any mention of the no-strike clause problem98
89 Id. at 819.
90 168 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 66 L.R.R.M. 1343 (Nov. 30, 1967).
91 Id. at 12 (trial examiner's decision).
92 Id. at 6, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1345. In General Electric Co., 6-CA-4377 (May 27, 1969)
(trial examiner's decision), the trial examiner upheld the disciplinary suspension of
employees covered by a no-strike clause who refused to cross a picket line.
93 See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
94 168 N.L.R.B. No. 147, at 10-11 (trial examiner's decision). The no-strike clause in
Swain & Morris provided: "There shall be no stoppage of work by strike or lockout or
any subterfuge thereof because of any dispute relating to the application of this agree-
ment .... " Id. at 10 (trial examiner's decision). Compare the Rockaway clause in note 83
supra.




The so-called no-picket-line contract clause guarantees to individ-
ual employees the right to refuse to cross a picket line. Although the
clause has long been utilized in some industries,96 Congress did not deal
with this type of contractual provision in the LMRA. Nevertheless, the
NLRB has had to adjudicate the legality of such clauses.
In Teamsters Local 878 (Arkansas Express, Inc.),97 the employing
carrier was struck by the Teamsters, who encouraged Teamster-repre-
sented employees of other carriers to take advantage of the no-picket-
line clause in their contract and refuse to cross the picket line at Arkan-
sas Express. The Board's General Counsel charged that the action of the
Teamsters violated section 8(b)(4)(A), and that the no-picket-line clause
in itself violated the section. The trial examiner dismissed the charge,
and the Board upheld the trial examiner, stating that the clause did
not violate the Act per se, although union activity to encourage em-
ployees to invoke the clause might constitute an unfair labor practice.98
Further use of no-picket-line clauses was encouraged by the Su-
preme Court. In the Rockaway case, the Court had specifically declared
that the refusals to cross picket lines could be contractually regulated
by no-strike or no-picket-line clauses since, in the Court's view, the
proviso to section 8(b)(4) "clearly enables contracting parties to embody
in their contract a provision against requiring an employee to cross a
picket line if they so agree."99
The NLRB, in accord with its ultimate attitude toward hot cargo
clauses,100 did not regard the no-picket-line clause as constituting author-
ization for a union to exert pressure on employees of a secondary em-
ployer to take advantage of the clause. In Albert Evans,101 a Teamsters
local represented a number of carriers that made deliveries to each
other. The Teamsters struck one carrier and began to picket others
whose employees were organized by the same local, whenever employees
of the first carrier made or picked up deliveries. The result, of course,
was to induce the employees of the other carriers to cease handling any
goods of the first carrier. The trial examiner found that this action was
96 See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. BuLL. No. 686, at 165 (1942).
97 92 N.L.R.B. 255 (1950).
98 Id. at 267-68. The NLRB took a similar view of hot cargo clauses, which gave em-
ployees the right to refuse to handle certain goods. See Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 93 (1958).
99 345 U.S. at 80.
100 See Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
101 110 N.L.R.B. 748 (1954).
[Vol. 55:940
REFUSALS TO CROSS PICKET LINES
an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(4)(A), and he re-
fused to accept the union's contention that no-picket-line clauses con-
stituted a defense to the unfair practice. The Board accepted his ruling.
The distinction that had been made by the NLRB and the courts
between the encouragement of secondary activity by hot cargo clauses
and the secondary activity itself, was not one that recommended itself
to a large segment of Congress. Consequently, when Congress passed the
Landrum-Griffin Act, it created section 8(e),'10 2 which specifically out-
lawed hot cargo clauses and made their existence per se an unfair labor
practice. In outlawing hot cargo clauses, however, Congress did not in-
tend to outlaw no-picket-line clauses. The original House bill contained
a provision exempting from its hot cargo ban no-picket-line clauses; and
although the Landrum-Griffin proposal, which was substituted for the
original House bill, contained no such exemption, the legislative history
indicates that the Landrum-Griffin hot cargo ban did not proscribe no-
picket-line clauses' 03
The NLRB was forced to decide whether section 8(e) outlawed
no-picket-line clauses in Truck Drivers Local 413 (Patton Warehouse,
Inc.).104 A Teamsters local had negotiated a contract containing the
following clause:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not
be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an em-
ployee refuses to enter upon any property involved in a labor dis-
pute or refuse [sic] to go through or work behind any picket line,
including the picket line of Unions party to this Agreement
102 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
103 On the day prior to House passage of the Landrum-Griffin bill, Representative
Cramer discussed the relationship between the hot cargo ban and the no-picket-line clause:
The Rockaway News case .... which is based on the proviso would there-
fore continue to be law under the Landrum-Griffin bill. It stands for the propo-
sition that "contracting parties may embody in their contract a provision against
requiring an employee to cross a picket line if they so agree...
First. The Landrum-Griffin hot-cargo provision puts in statutory form the existing
rule of the NLRB and the courts, including the Supreme Court, that hot-cargo
contracts are dnenforcible. It in no sense disturbs the further rule under which
employees may agree with the contracting union that an employee may-or may
not-be disciplined for refusal to cross a picket line at another employer's estab-
lishment. No reasonable interpretation of the language gives it such a meaning
that would interfere with this rule and no such interpretation is intended.
105 CONG. RZC. 15677 (1959). See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 44 MiNN. L. REv. 257, 272-73 (1959).
104 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963), enforced in part, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 916 (1964). At the same time as Patton Warehouse, the Board also dealt with a
companion case involving the same issue. Truck Drivers Local 728 (Brown Transp. Corp.),
140 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1963), enforced in part, 334 F-2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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and including picket lines at the Employer's place or places of
business.105
The employer argued that this clause was outlawed by section 8(e) and
that the union had violated section 8(b)(4)(A) by forcing its inclusion
in the contract. The trial examiner reviewed the legislative history of
section 8(e) and found a congressional intent to outlaw no-picket-line
clauses unless they protected the refusal of an employee to cross a picket
line at his place of employment. The Board read the legislative history
differently; interpreting section 8(e) in conjunction with the proviso to
section 8(b)(4), it concluded that no-picket-line clauses were legal if they
were limited (a) to protected activities engaged in by employees
against their own employer and (b) to activities against another
employer who has been struck by his own employees, where the
strike has been ratified or approved by their representative whom
the employer is required to recognize under the Act.106
'The Board ruled that the clause in question was not so limited and
was therefore invalid.
The Teamsters local appealed this decision to the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, and in its opinion the court of appeals discussed the
application of no-picket-line clauses in four hypothetical cases. It agreed
with the Board that a no-picket-line clause may operate to protect re-
fusals to cross picket lines "where the line is in connection with a pri-
mary dispute at the contracting employer's own premises."'' 0 The court
said that the Board's rule in regard to this situation was obviously cor-
rect because refusals to cross this kind of picket line were clearly pro-
tected under the Act. The court agreed with the Board that a no-picket-
line clause may not operate to protect refusals to cross picket lines when
"the picket line at the contracting employer's own premises is itself in
promotion of a secondary strike or boycott."'0 s To hold otherwise would
permit the unions to avoid the clear intent of section 8(e) and encour-
age secondary action of the type that sections 8(e) and 8(b) were in-
tended to prevent. The court also agreed with the Board "that the clause
,may validly protect refusals to cross a picket line at the premises of an-
:other employer if that picket line meets the conditions expressed in the
proviso to § 8(b)(4) of the Act."' 0 9 Finally, the court disagreed with the
105 140 N.L.R.B. at 1476.
106 Id. at 1481. Accord, Teamsters Local 386 (Valley Employers Ass'n), 152 N.L.R.B.
780 (1965); Teamsters Local 559 (Anopolsky & Son), 145 N.L.R.B. 722 (1963), modified, 147
N.L.R.B. 1128 (1964).
107 334 F.2d at 542-43 (emphasis in original).
108 Id. at 543 (emphasis in original).
109 Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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Board's rule that a no-picket-line clause could not protect "refusals to
cross a picket line at another employer's premises where that line does
not meet the conditions of the § 8(b)(4) proviso."110 It interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in Rockaway and the legislative history of sec-
tion 8(e) as permitting a union to contract for a no-picket-line clause
that protected refusals to cross any lawful primary picket line, whether
or not the line met the requirements of the proviso to section 8(b)(4).
The court pointed out that freeing such clauses from the limitation of
the proviso to section 8(b)(4) was consistent with the Board's rule that
refusals to cross picket lines were protected despite the restrictions of
that proviso. The court finally held that the contested no-picket-line
clause was valid insofar as it guaranteed immunity to employees who
refused to cross primary picket lines.'
The main weakness of the court's opinion was the possible contra-
diction between its ruling that no-picket-line clauses meeting the re-
quirements of the proviso to section 8(b)(4) were lawful and its ruling
that no-picket-line clauses permitting refusals to cross secondary picket
lines were unlawful, because a picket line could meet the requirements
of the proviso to section 8(b)(4) and still be secondary in nature.
This weakness became apparent in Drivers Local 695 (John B.
Threlfall d.b.a. Threlfall Construction Co.),112 where the Board de-
dared that a clause permitting refusals to cross picket lines described
in the proviso to section 8(b)(4) was illegal because it had served as the
basis of a refusal to cross a secondary picket line. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit recognized that this conclusion was contrary to its own dic-
tum in Patton Warehouse regarding picket lines described in the pro.
viso, but the court repudiated that dictum by agreeing with the Board's
rationale and conclusion.113 In response to the union claim that
requiring an ordinary employee to ascertain whether a given picket
line was primary or secondary before he could be sure that a no-picket-
line clause afforded him protection was impractical, the court could
110 Id. (emphasis in original).
"il Id. at 545. Accord, Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters, 154 N.L.R.B. 1598
(1965), enforced, 382 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1037 (1968); Teamsters
Local 386 (Valley Employers Ass'n), 152 N.L.R.B. 780 (1965); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (Couch Electric Co.), 151 N.L.R.B. 413 (1965); Los Angeles Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council (Portofino Marina), 150 N.L.R.B. 1590 (1965); Cement Masons
Local 97 (Interstate Employers, Inc.), 149 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1964).
112 152 N.L.R.B. 577 (1965), enforced, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11a 361 F.2d at 556"-51. See Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 155 N.L.R.B. 1115 (1965), enforced, No. 20783 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1966). Cf. Car-
penters Local 1273 v. Hill, 398 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1968), involving a § 303(b) civil suit
brought by a contractor over the union's attempt to secure an illegal no-picket-line clause.
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only reply that "employees and employers will generally be advised
by counsel and will not have to rely upon their own judgment.""u 4
CONCLUSION
Congress appears never to have considered whether refusals to cross
picket lines are protected activities. The failure of Congress to deal
with this issue is a product of its reluctance to formulate national labor
policy unless virtually compelled to do so--decisions regarding that
policy are so controversial and so fraught with political significance
that Congress is rarely willing to legislate. What legislation Congress
does pass is directed at problems of greater significance than refusals to
cross picket lines. Consequently, in this particular area Congress has
not performed its task of setting policy for the NLRB to follow. The
NLRB is thus left to formulate policy on its own, subject only to the
scrutiny of the courts.
The courts, however, have played only a circumscribed role in
dealing with the refusal problem. There are several reasons for this.
First, the courts can review NLRB actions only in cases that are brought
to them for enforcement. Such actions are expensive and are rarely
taken in refusal cases because of the small sums involved. Second, even
in the cases that are appealed, the courts must affirm the NLRB's find-
ings of fact if there is substantial evidence in the record to support them,
even though they are not bound by the NLRB's conclusions of law.
Third, the courts have traditionally tried to decide cases on the basis
314 361 F.2d at 551. This suggestion is unrealistic since it hardly seems probable that
a Teamster who encounters a picket line in the course of his deliveries will contact the
Teamsters' counsel and obtain an immediate legal opinion about the consequences of a
refusal to cross that line. The effect of the court's conclusion was to encourage additional
litigation in the area and, ironically, to discourage refusals to cross picket lines since the
refuser could generally not determine with certainty whether or not a given picket line
was primary or secondary. Of course, the court's opinion can be defended on the ground
that an opposite conclusion would have encouraged the erection of illegal picket lines.
The Teamsters apparently have accommodated themselves to the court's ruling. Their
1967 National Master Freight Agreement art. 9, § 1, contains the following modified no-
picket-line clause:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement, and it shall not be cause for dis-
charge or disciplinary action in the event an employee refuses to enter upon any
property involved in a primary labor dispute, or refuses to go through or work
behind any primary picket line, including the primary picket line of Unions party
to this Agreement, and including primary picket lines at the Employer's places of
business.
The major trucking associations have not been satisfied with this language and have pro-
posed to insert the word "lawful" to the description of picket lines in this provision.
BNA DAiLY LAB. REP. No. 4, AA-3 (Jan. 7, 1970).
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of the facts presented, and they have refused to promulgate rules broad
enough to cover circumstances not before them. Thus, normal judicial
practice has meant that the courts have failed to exercise effective
supervision over the NLRB's decisions regarding refusals. However,
the courts could play an important role in overseeing the creation of
a new refusal policy, and more adequately fulfill their role as "watch-
dogs of the Board,"1 15 by ruling directly on the basic issues presented
by Board decisions.""
To compensate for the failure of Congress to construct a refusal
policy and the reluctance or inability of the courts to play a creative
role, the NLRB might have utilized whatever vague guidelines pro-
vided by Congress and the courts, in conjunction with its own expertise,
to formulate a broad national policy. However, neither the trial exam-
iner nor the Board investigated the legislative history of the NLRA
and its amendments in any of the refusal cases. 117 Furthermore, the
NLRB decisions seem to indicate a practice on the part of the Board
and its trial examiners to use precedent that supports the desired result
and to ignore unfavorable court decisions. 1 8 When adverse opinions
are cited, their holdings are treated cavalierly or misstated;119 if they
115 NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 268 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
118 The institutional nature of the parties usually before the courts in NLRB enforce-
ment procedures, as well as the general interest aroused by such cases, which could result
in amicus briefs, perhaps warrants a departure from the belief that only through strictly
adversary proceedings can a court be advised of all the aspects of the issue at hand. But
see NLRB v, Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 US. 759, 764-65 (1969).
117 It is not altogether dear, however, that such an investigation would have been
fruitful. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. If the inquiry had been futile,
the Board should have stated so and proceeded to formulate policy, consciously recognizing
its lack of a congressional mandate.
118 Thus, in the 15 refusal cases decided subsequent to the Seventh Circuit's holding
in Illinois Bell that refusals to cross a picket line are not protected by § 7, that decision
has been cited by only two trial examiners and in only one Board opinion. Similar results
apply to the citation of the Second Circuit's Rockaway News and Eighth Circuit's Everist
rulings. Court decisions only slightly favorable to the NLRBs viewpoint, such as Red-
wing, or the NLRB's own decisions, such as Cyril de Cordova, are cited more often.
119 See the trial examiner's treatment of Illinois Bell in Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.,
166 N.L.R.B. 862, 865 & n.12 (1967); the Board's discussion of Rockaway News in Redwing
Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546 & n.5 (1962), and in Cooper Thermometer Co.,
154 N.L.R.B. 502, 504 (1965) (which cited the Second Circuit in Rockaway News as sup-
port for the proposition that refusals are protected); the distinguishing of Everist by the
trial examiner in Vangas, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 127, at 5 n.2 (Dec. 19, 1967) (trial exam-
iner's decision); and the use by the trial examiner in Vangas of the District of Columbia
Circuit's Overnight I opinion as authority for the rule that refusals are protected, al-
though that court had explicitly refused to so hold. Typical of this attitude is the
NLRB's constant citation of the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Redwing I
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are not ignored or misconstrued, the Board often adopts a policy of
simply refusing to follow them. 1 20
Although the NLRB has shown no interest in ascertaining the
intent of Congress with regard to refusals to cross picket lines, and al-
though it has shown even less interest in following the strictures of the
courts regarding this matter, it might have given heed to policy con-
siderations. Conspicuous by its absence in all the NLRB cases dealing
with refusals, however, has been any thoughtful analysis of the policy
considerations and alternatives involved or any attempt to weigh the
opposing interests.
If such an analysis were employed, it would seem that the refusing
employee has the strongest and most valid economic interest in situation
I-A,1 2 1 with some interest in situation I-B. 1 22 Consequently, his refusal
in I-A and possibly in I-B would seem to justify a policy of protection.
The refuser would appear to have a less significant economic interest
in situations I-C12 3 and II.124 The refuser's employer has a strong inter-
in support of the proposition that refusals are protected, even though all the court did in
that case was enforce the NLRB order denying the refuser's request for reinstatement.
120 Illustrative of this attitude is the trial examiner's opinion in Canada Dry Corp.,
154 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1965):
The Respondent's argument that the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in N.L.R.B. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. . . . is controlling and re-
quires a result different from that reached herein, is not appropriately addressed
to me. As the Board has continued to adhere to the principle set forth in Illinois
Bell Telephone Company .... which was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals
in the above-cited case (see, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. and Rochana Carriers,
Inc... .), I have no alternative but to follow Board precedent until the Board or
the Supreme Court holds to the contrary.
Id. at 1770 n.10.
121 See p. 943 supra for a designation of the situations in which refusals to cross
picket lines occur. I-A constitutes the primary economic strike situation.
122 This situation was presented by: Southern Greyhound Lines, 169 N.L.R.B. No.
148, 67 L.R.R.M. 1368 (Feb. 23, 1968), enforced, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1970); Canada Dry
Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1965); Cinch Mfg. Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 371 (1950); New York Tel.
Co., 89 N.L.RB 383 (1950); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp, 84 N.L.R.B. 851 (1949), enforced
sub nom. Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1950).
123 Situation I-C is exemplified by: G & H Towing Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 66
L.R.R.M. 1343 (Nov. 30, 1967); Albert Evans, 110 N.L.R.B. 748 (1954); Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1950), enforcement denied, 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 885 (1951).
124 Situation II-A, where the picket line is erected by the employees of the picketed
employer at their, rather than the refuser's, place of employment, is the most typical case
dealt with in this article. Such a situation was involved in: Swain & Morris Constr. Co.,
168 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 67 L.R.R.M. 1039 (Dec. 29, 1967); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166
N.L.R.B. 862 (1967); Overnite Transp. Co. (II), 164 N.L.R.B. 72 (1967); Overnite Transp.
Co. (I), 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965), enforced in part, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966); L.G.
Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963), enforced in part, 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964); Red-
wing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced
sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
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est at stake in all type I situations and a more limited economic interest
in type II situations.125 However, his economic interests in I-A and pos-
sibly in I-B would seem to be subordinate to the interest of the refusing
employee, although an opposite conclusion seems to be justified in the
other situations. The refusing employee's union has an economic inter-
est in I-A that justifies protection of the refusal in this case but not in
the other situations. The interests of the pickets, their union, and the
picketed employer are not particularly significant in these cases and
can be disregarded. The public has a general interest in limiting the
scope of labor disputes and in preventing illegal secondary picket lines
-an interest that justifies protecting the refusal in I-A and possibly in
I-B but not otherwise. Of course, the results reached by weighing the
interests of outside parties should yield to the results reached by the
weighing of these interests by the parties themselves in the form of a
collective bargaining agreement, unless its provisions are contrary to
law.
It should be recognized, however, that the above approach has its
weaknesses. The interests of the parties involved in this kind of a dis-
pute may not be as significant in reality as they appear to be in theory.
An alternative to a balancing approach to adjudicate priorities in this
area would be for the NLRB to extend the legal rules applicable to
analogous situations. This method would tend to further the main-
tenance of the logical structure of the law developed under other por-
tions of the LMRA.12 Viewed in this way, the refusal to cross a picket
line resembles either a general economic strike or a partial economic
strike, depending on whether the refusal takes place at the locale of the
refuser's employer or at some other location. Indeed, in situations I-A
and I-B, the refuser is essentially an economic striker, while in situation
II he is a partial striker-a man refusing to do one part of his job but
insisting on his right to do the remainder. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, it would seem that the refuser in I-A and I-B should receive no
more protection than is given an economic striker, and the refuser in II
should receive no more protection than is given a partial striker. It
thus becomes evident that the NLRB's attempt to relax the Mackay
U.S. 905 (1964); Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951), enforcement denied,
197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Teamsters Local 878 (Arkansas Ex-
press, Inc.), 92 N.L.R.B. 255 (1950); Cyril de Cordova & Bros., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950).
Albert Evans, 110 N.L.R.B. 748 (1954), presented a type II-B situation.
125 The interest of the refuser's employer in situation II would seem to merit par-
ticular protection, however, because of his lack of responsibility for, and his inability to
do anything about, the dispute giving rise to the establishment of the picket line in
question.
120 See Winter, supra note 17, at 58.
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rule as it applies to refusers in I-A, or other refusers, by interjecting the
issue of the order in which dismissal and replacement took place, is
inconsistent -with what is done in an analogous area of the law. A
similar criticism can be leveled at the NLRB's attempts to help the
refuser in situation II. The refuser in I-C presents a special case. He
certainly resembles the general economic striker more than the partial
striker since he is refusing to perform all the functions of his job. On
the other hand, in honoring a picket line that has not been erected
by his fellow employees, he is not seeking to advance any direct or in-
direct economic interests, as are the refusers in I-A and I-B. Indeed, he
is probably honoring an illegal secondary picket line or an organiza-
tional picket line of some type. Consequently, it seems not to be in the
public interest to protect his action. This situation, however, is the only
one in which the two suggested methods of analysis are likely to yield
different results. Of course, the parties in question should be given the
power to regulate their rights inter se by virtue of collective bargaining
agreements except insofar as such agreements protect refusals to cross
illegal picket lines.127
From all that appears in the record of these cases, the NLRB has
failed to utilize either approach and might well have been making na-
tional labor policy by flipping coins rather than by using its expertise,
although an examination of the general trend of these cases suggests
that the NLRB is pursuing as a consistent goal the aggrandizement of
union power at the expense of the individual employee and the em-
ployer.128
127 Regardless of which method of analysis the Board employs in determining a policy
with regard to refusals, it could articulate this policy either on a case-by-case basis or
through the exercise of its rule-making authority. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 594
U.S. 759, 763-66 (1969); Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE LJ. 571 (1970).
128 See the recently-released Ervin Subcommittee Report on the NLRB (SuacoMm. ON
SEPARATION OF POWERS, SENATE COrMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91sr CONG., 1ST Sass., CONGRES-
SIONAL OvEsGRT OF ADmnIsTRvE AGENCIES (NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOA"n) (Comm.
Print 1970)), which states:
On the basis of its study, the subcommittee has found that in choosing be-
tween conflicting values-in difficult cases and in some that are not so difficult-
the National Labor Relations Board has of late unreasonably emphasized the
establishment and maintenance of collective bargaining and strong unions to the
exclusion of other important statutory purposes which often involve the rights of
individual employees. Unions unable to persuade a majority of employees to opt
for collective bargaining have been able to get the Board to impose it for them.
And the Board has been able to do this by a freewheeling interpretation of the
statute's more general provisions, by applying double standards, and by ignoring
plain legislative mandates. The Board has also, we find, in matters going beyond
recognition and the establishment of bargaining, given interpretations to the
statute which reflect an over-emphasis on helping unions impose their will on
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What emerges, then, from a study of the cases involving a refusal
to cross picket lines, is a conviction that our system for making labor
policy is not working well. What is needed, in general, is a greater
effort on the part of all institutions involved in formulating national
labor policy to perform the functions assigned to them. Thus, Con-
gress must find some way to pass labor legislation on a regular basis.
Similarly, the courts must endeavor to broaden the scope of their re-
view of the NLRB's actions. Above all, however, the NLRB must be
willing to heed the wishes of Congress and the strictures of the courts
regarding its attempts to formulate national labor policy.
employers and individual employees. The Board clearly believes that it knows
what is best for employees and all too frequently subordinates individual rights
to the interests of organized labor.
Id. at 3-4. The Ervin Subcommittee Report was particularly critical of the Board's treat-
ment of cases arising under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1964), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce an em-
ployee in the exercise of his rights under § 7 (id. § 157), and which also modified § 7 to
guarantee employees the right to engage or refrain from engaging in § 7 activities. SUB-
COAM. ON SEPARATION OF PowERs, supra at 12-14. The intent of these amendments was to
make it improper for a union, or its agents, to interfere with, coerce, or restrain employees
in the exercise of their rights to take action or to refrain therefrom. 93 CONG. REc. 4021,
4435 (1947). There is no indication that Congress intended by either of these amendments
to protect workers who refused to refrain from crossing picket lines at secondary locales,
although Congress may specifically have intended to protect workers who crossed mass
picket lifles at their own plant. See id. at 4436. Certainly it intended that the NLRB pro-
tect the right to cross a picket line if it also protected the right to refuse to cross a picket
line. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 208-13 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
One might expect that the NLRB would treat refusals to honor picket lines much as
it has treated refusals to cross picket lines-that is, by considering whether a refusal to
honor a picket line is protected activity. No case involving a decision to cross picket lines
has been discussed on the basis of this analysis. Instead, the Board and the courts have
stressed the right of labor unions to punish those who seek to refrain from exercising
rights that the Board so assiduously protects in other contexts. The road to Allis-Chalmers
(Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), enforcement denied
sub nom. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S.
175 (1967)), which upheld the authority of a union to discipline its members for crossing
a picket line, contrasts strangely with the path adhered to by the Board in refusal cases.
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